How Government policy attacked
and almost destroyed the British Car Industry
Dateline: 16th March 1994
It is quite clear, following the sale of Rover Group to BMW, that
the main barrier to a British sale or flotation of the shares was
the very large financing cost of Rover's operations.
Few in politics grasp the difference between investment in and the
financing of a business. Several City institutions were prepared to
invest capital in Rover but banks were apparently unwilling to commit
loan facilities to cover peak financing requirement of more than £2,000m.
But this huge financing need occurs (as most of the problems of
the British car industry since the war) because of the action of government.
While Rover's monthly financing requirement averages no more than
£200m - £300m there is a very large annual peak in the run up to August
when the new licence prefix attracts the more adolescent of our fellow
citizens into the car showrooms.
This ludicrous practice has always plagued British car manufacturers
and suppliers and of course their banks who inevitably regard such
massive financing peaks as far more risky than a standard pattern
of company financing. They either require far more base capital from
British manufacturers than they would in other countries or they
refuse to finance at all until (as has now happened) a company based
in a country, which has no state induced sales peak, takes over the
British manufacturer.
Now that this long standing problem has been a major contributor
to the loss of British ownership of our car industry is it too much
to expect that even politicians might wake up and put an end to this
disastrous August car binge?
POST SCRIPT - 2002
Eventually, years after the takeover of Rover by BMW and the loss
of thousands of British car workers jobs, the above advice was heeded
by the British Government. Rover is now once again an independent
company, there is no longer an August rush to the salesrooms and there
are further signs of progress among smaller British car manufacturers.
